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COMMENTS

PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTES OF REPOSE:
ON DENYING AN INJURED PLAINTIFF HIS OR
HER DAY IN COURT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The highly touted, proconsumer product liability legislation which
swept the fifty states of this country' in the mid-1970's has left in its
wake a class of remediless, injured plaintiffs whose number continues to
grow. These frustrated plaintiffs are the victims of product liability
statutes containing absolute time barriers beyond which a claim for injury cannot be brought, irrespective of when the cause of action accrued. These time barriers to claims are known as "statutes of repose."
Statutes of repose in the area of product liability have come to be
the source of a thorny constitutional problem pitting the injured consumer's right to redress for his or her product-caused injuries' against
the right of the manufacturer or distributor to be protected against
stale and vexatious claims.' Because the statutes deny consumers the
I

!. For background information on product liability legislation in the last two decades, see
Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Product Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317
(1978-79); Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability: The Supreme Court of California
1977-78, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979).
2. One court has stated that statutes of repose
[do] not meet the realities of life in today's society where the consumer is dependent on a
remote manufacturer for many of the products he uses. The "repose" of the manufacturer
must give way to the welfare of the consuming public, and if this means liability in
perpetuity, so be it. Products containing defects when manufactured, which remain undetected, are veritable time bombs ready to explode in the face of the hapless consumer at
any time. Manufacturers cannot escape their responsibility for creating such dangers by
invoking statutes of limitations . . . .If it can be proven that the manufacturer was responsible for the defect, then it ought to be held responsible for the results.
Nelson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (D.N.H. 1970). See Heath v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., N.H. __, 464 A.2d 288 (1983).
3. One commentator noted:
It has been long conceded that some time limitation on the ability to bring suit is necessary
if practicality as well as justice are to be served. Defendants at some point should be able
to institute financial plans with certainty, free from the threat of stale claims; plaintiffs, if
truly aggrieved, should pursue remedies within a reasonable time; and defendants and
courts should not have to deal with cases in which the passage of time seriously hampers
the search for truth.
Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980's: "Repose is not the Destiny" of Manufacturers, 61
N.C.L. REV. 33, 36 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co.,
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right to bring a claim after the stated period regardless of when the
injury occurred, constitutional attacks have been launched against their
validity. But due to disparate analyses and results in cases evaluating
the constitutionality of statutes of repose, 4 the future of these statutes
in state product liability law is uncertain.
A leading expert on statutes of repose recently predicted that constitutional challenges to repose statutes are likely to increase in the future.' In light of this possibility, this comment will examine the bases
and impact of the constitutional attacks made to date. The article will
ultimately forecast a bleak future for statutes of repose in the area of
product liability law.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Defining the Subject

The typical product liability statute of repose works in conjunction
with a statute of limitations, in that suit must be filed within both the
usual statutory limitations period as well as within the longer repose
period. 6 For example, a statute may provide that no product liability
action may be commenced except within two years of accrual of a
cause of action, and, in any event, within ten years from the date of
317 F. Supp. 676, 682 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
4. To date, the Supreme Courts of Alabama, Florida, and New Hampshire and the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina have held their product liability statutes of repose unconstitutional.
See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty Corp., 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982) (which invalidated
ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (1975)); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980)
(which voided FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1975)); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App.
589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified and affd, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982) (in which
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1979) was held unconstitutional); Heath, N.H. -. , 464 A.2d
288 (1983) (which voided N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2, 11(a) (Supp. 1979)).
In contrast, high courts in Tennessee, Illinois, and Indiana have upheld the constitutionality
of their product liability statutes. See Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn.
1979) (which upheld the constitutionality of TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3703 (1979)); Thornton v.
Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Il1. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981) (which upheld the constitutionality
of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2 (1979)); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Ind. _ 418
N.E.2d 207 (1981) (which upheld the constitutionality of IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-1 (Supp. 1980)).
See infra text accompanying notes 56-100.
5. Francis E. McGovern, associate dean of the Cumberland School of Law of Samford University and an authority on statutes of repose, was interviewed by the National Law Journal in
connection with the 1983 decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Heath, - N.H. -,
464 A.2d 288 (1983), in which the state's product liability law was overturned on the basis of an
unconstitutional repose provision. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. The National
Law Journal reported that "Dean McGovern . . . said that challenges to every state products
liability law containing such a provision are likely now. 'There's no question that it will be tested
for its constitutionality,' he said." Appleson, A State Boost for U.S. Product Law?, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 8, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
6. Special Project, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues: An Analysis of
the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose in Products Liability, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 449, 457
(1981).
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sale of the product in question. 7 The important distinction between a
statute of limitations and a statute of repose is the date on which the
statute begins to run. The former begins to run with the traditional
accrual of the cause of action, typically from the date of injury, or, in
certain cases, when injury was or should reasonably have been discovered.8 A statute of repose, however, usually begins to run from some
other date,9 such as the date of sale of the product. 10 Like a conventional statute of limitations, the statute of repose may bar an action if
the time requirement is not satisfied." Thus, the repose statute effectively places an outer limit on the period in which manufacturers remain liable and injured parties may sue for product defects. 2
The harsh and therefore controversial's effect of the statute of re-

7. For a listing and description of product liability statutes of repose in various states, see
McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30
AM. U.L. REV. 579, 638 (1981). Since publication of this data, courts in four states have invalidated their repose statutes. See supra note 4.
8. See McGovern, supra note 7, at 584-85.
9. Other dates triggering the commencement of the repose period include:
occurrence of damage, initial use of product, sale of product to initial user, delivery of
product to initial user, date of manufacture of product, occurrence of governmentally imposed duty on a defendant, end of defendant's duty to inspect or repair a product, expiration of expected or useful life of a product, end of possession or control of a product, or
date of modification of a product.
McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability
Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 425 (1981).
10. Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 602, 609 (1983);
Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977
INS. L.J. 535, 536.
!1. Special Project, supra note 6, at 457.
12. Id.
13. Critics of statutes of repose often cite from Judge Frank's dissent in Dincher v. Marlin
Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952), commenting on the illogical and unreasonable "Alice
in Wonderland" effect of repose statutes:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced
before ever your marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never built,
or miss a train running on non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has
always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal "axiom," that a statute of limitations
does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before
a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.
Id. at 823 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Accord Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 295-96 (1983); Massery, supra note 10, at 540.
N.H. -,
-,
These critics draw authority for their criticism from the United States Supreme Court statement that
[i]t may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. A statute could
not bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this opportunity; if it should
attempt to do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions.
Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902). Accord Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C.
App. 589, 595, 284 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1981), modified and affd, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415
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pose is that it could bar an injured plaintiff's lawsuit even before

purchase of the product or occurrence of the injury.14 If the plaintiff's

right to sue is extinguished before a cause of action arises, the plaintiff
is of course left legally unprotected.15 For example, if a ten-year, dateof-manufacture repose statute is in force, then a plaintiff who, on July
1, 1983, purchased a defective product manufactured on June 30, 1973,
would automatically be denied legal recourse for any future injuries
caused by the defect. The plaintiff would be remediless since the right
to sue was abolished the day before the product was purchased-the
day which marked the ten-year anniversary of the date of manufacture.

B.

The Question of Need

Statutes of repose were enacted in many states in the late 1970's
as control devices on the somewhat unrestrained sweep of consumerism
promoted by early product liability legislation and the subsequent judicial expansion of that legislation.' As the exposure of manufacturers
grew, increased numbers of lawsuits and larger damage awards resulted. 7 Manufacturers and insurers alleged that these increases were
responsible for the drastically increased cost and seriously diminished

availability of product liability insurance, and that legislation was
needed which would establish a cutoff point for manufacturer liability.' 8 However, an extensive investigation of this allegation, conducted

(1982); Heath, N.H. at -,
464 A.2d at 294.
However, several courts have regarded plaintiffs' allegations that repose statutes bar a cause
of action before it accrues as a
misconception of the effect of the statute. It does not bar a cause of action; its effect,
rather, is to prevent what might otherwise be a cause of action, from ever arising. . . . The
injured party literally has no cause of action. The harm that has been done is damnum
absque injuria-awrong for which the law affords no redress. The function of the statute
is thus rather to define substantive rights than to alter or modify a remedy. The Legislature
is entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right is
disturbed.
Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199-200, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) (emphasis
in original). See also Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Il1. App. 3d 722, 726, 425 N.E.2d 522, 525
(1981) (citing Rosenberg, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972)).
14. Johnson, Products Liability "Reform".- A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 677,
690 (1978).
15. Id.
16. See generally Dworkin, supra note 3; Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 745 (1982).
17. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 33-34.
18. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663 (1978).
At the February 1, 1978, hearing of the Energy and Consumer Affairs Committee of the
New Hampshire State Senate, the vice-president of International Paper Box Machine Company
testified that the company's product liability insurance costs increased 3,000% between 1975,
when its premium was $8,000 a year, and 1976, when its premium shot up to $241,000 a year.
Hearings on S. 28 Before the New HampshireSenate Comm. on Energy and Consumer Affairs,
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in 1976 under the direction of the United States Department of Commerce, 19 determined that the insurance industry's ratemaking procedures were not based on objective factors, such as amount of damage
awards and number of claims, but rather on subjective estimations of
anticipated losses, influenced as much by jaded perceptions of reality as
by reality itself.2 0 Furthermore, part of the rise in insurance rates must
be attributed to the manufacture of unreasonably unsafe products."
Nevertheless, most state legislatures enacted statutes of repose with the
intention of alleviating the open-ended liability of manufacturers and
presumably reducing insurance rates."
Manufacturers2 and insurance organizations2 4 have emphasized
that other considerations as well have been involved in enactment of
repose statutes. The difficult evidentiary problems inherent in suits concerning old products have frequently been cited in justification of stat-

1978 Legislature, Special Sess. 9 (1978) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
19. In response to the allegations of manufacturers and insurance companies that a product
liability insurance "crisis" existed, a federal interagency task force was established in 1976 by the
President's Economic Policy Board to investigate and report on the problem. The task force, working under the direction of the Department of Commerce, reported that "[t]he average cost of
product liability insurance is less than I percent of sales in most of the Task Force's target industries." INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL
REPORT Xxxvii (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT]. Further, it concluded that "[t]here is no widespread problem of product liability insurance being unavailable."
Id. at xxxv.
20. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 679; PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT, supra note 19,
at 1-27.
The Interagency Task Force Insurance Study, an independent contractor report which was a
primary source for the FinalReport, concluded:
Rates for product liability insurance are based largely or, for some products, entirely on
nonstatistically derived, judgmental estimates of loss frequency and severity. Further, the
rates can be modified, based on prior loss experience and nontangible factors. Thus, while
actuarial considerations are a part of determining the appropriate rate levels, the impact of
the actuarial analysis on the final rate used is minimal.
I INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT
OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 1-40 (1977).

21.

Johnson, supra note 14, at 679.

22.

See. e.g., Thornton, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 425 N.E.2d at 524; Heath, -

N.H. at

-'

464 A.2d at 293; Dworkin, supra note 10, at 604 n.ll; Martin, supra note 16, at 749.
The Alabama Legislature identified the problem it hoped to resolve by its product liability
legislation:
[P]roduct liability actions and litigation have increased substantially, and the cost of such
litigation has risen in recent years. The legislature further finds that these increases are
having an impact upon consumer prices, and upon the availability, cost and use of product
liability insurance, thus, affecting the availability of compensation for injured consumers.
Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to provide a comprehensive time framework for
the commencement and maintenance of all product liability actions brought in this state.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-500 (Supp. 1983).
23. See, e.g., Thornton, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 425 N.E.2d at 524.
24.
AGE

See generally AMERICAN

INSURANCE ASS'N, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATIVE PACK-

(1977) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
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utes of repose. 2 ' Proponents of repose statutes have also criticized the

"fundamental unfairness" which results from the application of current
legal and technical standards to products which were manufactured
and sold more than ten years prior to the commencement of a given

suit." Finally, the availability of some degree of relief for workplace
injuries through workers' compensation is thought to ameliorate the
usually uncompromising effect of repose statutes in the minds of some
manufacturers and insurers.2 7
Critics, however, deny the need for statutes of repose, urging that
all the available evidence suggests that the number and types of claims
barred by such statutes have had little if any effect on reducing insurance premiums.2 8 The critics also assert that manufacturers placing defective products into the stream of commerce are far better equipped to
guard against consequential damages caused by such defective products

than are injured consumers. 9 Some critics concede that manufacturers
should be protected from claims for injuries caused by worn-out products; however, these critics reject repose statutes as a solution because

the statutes effectively codify a "uniform wearing-out time" for all
products, without accounting for the vast number of differences existing not only between dissimilar products, but even between similar
products based on their use and maintenance.8 0 Opponents of repose
statutes have critically concludedthat these laws effectively reduce the

incentive of manufacturers to build safe, long-lasting products since the
laws afford manufacturers absolute protection from suit after a given
number of years."'
There is, in fact, little evidence that product liability statutes of
repose have reduced insurance rates,32 or that an individual state statute can ever affect the national insurance ratemaking process.33 More-

25. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
There comes a time when he [the defendant] ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be
called on to resist a claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
Rosenberg, 61 N.J. at 201, 293 A.2d at 667-68 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950)).
26. See Thornton, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 425 N.E.2d at 524.
27. Martin, supra note 16, at 759.
28. Johnson, supra note 14, at 680, 691; Massery, supra note 10, at 545; McGovern, supra
note 7, at 595.
29. Martin, supra note 16, at 542.
30. Phillips, supra note 18, at 673.
31. Johnson, supra note 14, at 691; Massery, supra note 10, at 544.
32. See, e.g., Letter Report from Commission to Study Product Injury Reparations to New
Hampshire Governor Hugh J. Gallen 2, 5 (Dec. 21, 1979) (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review); see also McGovern, supra note 7, at 595.
33. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty Corp., 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
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over, the last comprehensive study conducted of product liability claims
indicated that products purchased more than six years prior to an injury-causing event comprised only 2.7% of the products involved in the
claims surveyed.34 Even acknowledging the possibility that this statistic
could have increased in the years since its formulation, old-product
suits comprise but a small minority of product liability claims."5 Furthermore, any problems in producing fresh evidence or in avoiding
standards based on changes in technology are problems faced by both
the plaintiff-user and the defendant-manufacturer.
Of more serious consequence is the barrier these statutes pose to
recovery for product-related, delayed-manifestation injuries, such as
cancer and asbestosis. ° One commentator has noted that there is little
indication that most legislators intended to include delayed-manifestation cases within the bar established by the repose statute.3 7 Yet repose
statutes technically prevent many seriously injured plaintiffs-whose
injuries do not become apparent until a decade or more after use of, or
exposure to, a product-from having their day in court. While exceptions to the bar have been added to many state statutes for specific
delayed-manifestation injuries,38 many new types of product-caused
delayed-manifestation injuries, caused by new hazards of technology,
are discovered yearly. 3° Unless exceptions are granted and each of
these latent injuries is allowed to escape the repose statute's bar, " application of the statute will be so irregular as to be arbitrary. Consequently, some of that group of plaintiffs with potentially provable
claims, who were not careless in delaying the filing of their actions, will
be denied entry into court.
The merits of the dispute concerning the need for statutes of re-

34. Massery, supra note 10, at 542. This frequently cited study involved an analysis of
24,452 records of product liability claims closed by twenty-three major liability insurers from July

1, 1976, to March 15, 1977. For more on the principal findings, see INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE,
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS
(1977) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
35. Johnson, supra note 14, at 690.
36. Delayed-manifestation injuries are those injuries which are not observable until many
years after exposure to a causative agent. Many such injuries have been traced to exposure to a
product defect as the causative agent. For instance, extended exposure to asbestos products has
resulted in cases of asbestosis-symptoms of which first appear as long as twenty years after
exposure. Other examples of delayed-manifestation injuries include radiation sickness, beryliosis
(caused by prolonged exposure to fiberglass), cancer caused by prenatal exposure to DES, cancer
caused by exposure to microwaves, formaldehyde, or agent orange. See generally Dworkin, supra
note 3; Dworkin, supra note 10.
37. Dworkin, supra note 3. The primary focus of most legislators was to limit the liability of
manufacturers for old products. Id.
38. Id. at 47 n.90.
39. Id. at 44.
40. See,
Dworkin, supra
Published
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pose do not appear to favor the manufacturer. Studies have failed to
prove the assumed relationship between increased numbers and
amounts of old-product claims and the increased cost of product liability insurance.4 1 This being so, the statutes have seemingly failed to accomplish their legislative objectives. 42 In battling the application of
these time barriers, plaintiffs and other opponents of repose statutes
have alleged that the application of the statutes unnecessarily inflicts
unconstitutional injury. The injuries alleged have formed the front lines
of plaintiffs' assaults upon the constitutionality of statutes of repose in
the area of product liability.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of product liability repose statutes has been
decided by the high courts of only seven states. Three states have held
the statutes constitutional, while four have ruled them unconstitutional.4 8 As a result of the most recent of these decisions (in which the
New Hampshire statute was successfully defeated4 4 ), more constitutional attacks on other state repose statutes are expected.4 5 Despite the
variation in phrasing and construction among state statutes and constitutions, the decisions of these seven courts will no doubt be examined
carefully by those state appellate courts faced with the task of deciding
the constitutionality of other state product liability statutes of repose.
Also of importance to future efforts at constitutional evaluation will be
cases deciding the constitutionality of statutes of repose in areas beyond product liability. Cases dealing with analogous statutes of repose
which limit architect-contractor liability4 6 and medical malpractice
claims 47 have been relied upon in a few of the principal decisions and
will continue to play a part in constitutional decisionmaking regarding
statutes in the product liability area. The following constitutional evaluation will, therefore, focus on these two categories of cases.
Due process and equal protection are the two main grounds on
which product liability statutes of repose have been subjected to constitutional attack. Nearly all of the cases are based upon provisions of the

41. See supra note 32.
42. See supra note 22.
43. See supra note 4.
44. Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., N.H. -,
464 A.2d 288 (1983).
45. See supra note 4.
46. See, e.g., Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (architect-contractor repose statute held unconstitutional); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190,
293 A.2d 662 (1972) (architect-contractor repose statute held constitutional). See also infra text
accompanying notes 70-77, 88-93.
47. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (medical malpractice
repose statute held unconstitutional). See also infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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relevant state constitution, rather than on the fifth or fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution."8 In some cases, the
state provisions have no counterpart in the Federal Constitution. 9
However, since the interests protected by these distinctive state constitutional provisions are also protected under the broader provisions of
the due-process or equal-protection clauses, 50 courts have engaged in
due-process or equal-protection analysis in determining whether the
more specific state constitutional interest has been infringed.
A.

Equal Protection

In any equal-protection challenge, the classification which is established by operation of the challenged legislation must be related, to a
judicially specified degree, to a valid state interest in order to pass constitutional muster. Application of the rational-basis, heightened-scrutiny or strict-scrutiny standard determines how close this relationship
must be and how important the government interest which must exist. 1
The strict-scrutiny standard, which is applied only in situations where a
"fundamental right" or "suspect classification" is involved, is clearly
inapplicable to the analysis of repose statutes because such statutes
have never been found to involve either category of protected
52
interests.
The majority of equal-protection challenges to product liability
statutes of repose have been evaluated under the rational-basis or minimum-rationality standard 53 which, in this context, requires only that
the statute be reasonably or rationally related to the state's objective of
reducing product liability insurance rates. Such challenges have largely
failed in the past and will continue to fail in the future due to the
inherently permissive nature of this test. In applying the test, courts
have traditionally accorded challenged legislation a strong presumption

48. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 53.
49. For instance, state constitutional provisions granting access to courts for redress of injury have no specific federal counterpart, although the interest protected may arguably be covered
by the federal due-process clause. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. i, § 21.
50. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 53.
51. Where a "fundamental right" or "suspect classification" is involved, courts exercise a
strict-scrutiny standard of review and demand that the legislation be the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling state interest. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Rights
deemed substantial, though not fundamental, have been protected under an intermediate or
heightened-scrutiny standard of equal-protection analysis which requires that the legislation have
a close and substantial relation to an important government interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976). Finally, the traditional rational-basis standard (applied to all other rights) requires
only that the challenged legislation have a reasonable relation to a valid state interest. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
52. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 54; McGovern, supra note 7, at 607.
53. See McGovern, supra note 7, at 607.
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of constitutionality, particularly in cases where economic regulation is
involved."" Little in the way of evidence is needed to establish the required reasonable relationship.
However, in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,"6 the most recent
and well-reasoned case invalidating the constitutionality of a product
liability repose statute, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied the
intermediate or heightened-scrutiny test of equal-protection analysis."7
In Heath, a twelve-year date-of-sale repose statute barred the product
liability claims of a consolidated group of plaintiffs.5 8 The court noted
that the New Hampshire Legislature had enacted the product liability
law in order to protect manufacturers from the undue burden caused
by rapidly rising insurance rates. 9 In conjunction with its enactment of
the legislation, the legislature appointed a commission to study and report on the effectiveness of the law in improving the availability of
product liability insurance. 60 The commission's report, cited by the
Heath court, concluded that while insurance affordability and availability had become less of a problem, there was little indication that such
facts were attributable to the enactment of the new product liability
law."1
The Heath court invoked a New Hampshire constitutional provision which entitles every plaintiff to a remedy by means of legal recourse for all personal injuries or property damage.62 In Carson v.
Maurer,6 8 the court had previously discussed this right to recover for
personal injuries and used it in striking down the New Hampshire medical malpractice repose statute. In labelling it "an important substan54. Id. at 607-08.
55. Id. The Supreme Court described the requirements of the minimum-rationality or rational-basis test in McGowan, 366 U.S. 420 (1961):
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
id. at 425-26.
56. Heath, N.H. -_,464 A.2d 288 (1983).
57. Id. at -,
464 A.2d at 295.
58. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2, 11(a) (Supp. 1979).
59. Heath, N.H. at -,
464 A.2d at 293.
60. Id.
61. Id. at -,
464 A.2d at 294.
62. Id. The provision states:
Every subject of this state is entitled to a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws,
for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character; to obtain right and
justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely and without any denial;
promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws.
N.H. CONST. pt. 1,art. 14.
63. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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tive right," the court in'Carson considered this state constitutional
right sufficiently important to require that any restriction on it receive
closer judicial scrutiny than that afforded under the rational-basis
test." The Carson court, therefore, found application of the heightened-scrutiny test appropriate. 5
Using the Carson court justification for application of heightened
scrutiny, the court in Heath held that the standard of review was
whether the statute at issue was reasonable and substantially related to
the stated legislative objective." The court concluded that the statute
was inherently unreasonable because it eliminated a plaintiff's cause of
action before the wrong could reasonably be discovered. 7 Based on the
state commission's conclusion that the repose statute's impact on insurance rates was doubtful, the court further held that the repose statute
was not substantially related to its objective of reducing insurance
rates. 8 Indeed, the court regarded the statute as having "become entirely divorced from its underlying purpose." 6 9 The statute was thus
70
overturned.
The Heath decision could have very important precedential value.
This is the first case to invalidate a product liability statute of repose
utilizing an intermediate standard of equal-protection analysis. It represents authoritative product liability case law empowering courts to
avoid the automatic application of the rational-basis test and the consequent presumption of constitutional validity. The application of Heath
in this regard may be limited to those states governed under a constitutional provision similar to New Hampshire's which guarantees the right
to a remedy under the law. However, this decision is undoubtedly significant to all plaintiffs whose entry into court is blocked by a repose
statute.
A few states have taken a different equal-protection approach to
the constitutionality of their architect-contractor statutes of repose, but
have not yet applied this approach in a product liability context. 71 The
approach has derived from state constitutional provisions which restrict
the legislature from enacting any private or special legislation in enumerated areas which grants an exclusive privilege or immunity to an

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
berg, 61

Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830.
Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 831.
464 A.2d at 295.
N.H. at -,
Heath, Id. at -, 464 A.2d at 295.
Id. at -, 464 A.2d at 296.
Id.
Id. at -, 464 A.2d at 299.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). But see RosenN.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
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individual or group.7" In Skinner v. Anderson,7 and Phillips v. ABC
Builders, Inc. 74 which adopted Skinner's reasoning, the Illinois and
Wyoming Supreme Courts, respectively, determined that this constitutional restriction did not prohibit the establishment of legislative classifications that are reasonably related to their legislative purposes.7 5 The
courts therefore applied something of an equal-protection, rational-basis analysis to their repose statutes, questioning whether the immunity
from suit granted only to architects and contractors under the state
repose statutes was reasonably related to the legislative objective of
preventing lawsuits based on stale evidence. 76 Both courts concluded
that their respective statutes were not reasonably related to this legislative objective because they did not apply uniformly to all persons similarly situated, but discriminated against owners of improvements and
materialmen.7 7 The failure of the statutes to pass the rational-basis test
invalidated them under state constitutional law. 78
The success of any similar attack on the validity of a product liability repose statute is difficult to predict. Unreasonable discrimination
among classes of product liability defendants is avoided in the wording
of most statutes, either by a comprehensive listing of all possible classes
of defendants or by the express application of the statute to all product
liability-based actions for damages.7 9 If no discrimination among product liability defendants is apparent, then courts will presume the constitutionality of the statute, giving deference to the legislative function of
enacting statutes reasonably related to valid state purposes. In the past,
most courts have failed to evaluate the effectiveness of repose statutes
on product liability insurance because the issue has not been raised by
plaintiffs. 80 If more plaintiffs persuasively argued the effectiveness issue
and more courts examined the merits of those arguments, the constitu-

72. For example, § 27 of article III of the Wyoming Constitution provides:
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated
cases, that is to say: . . . for limitation of civil actions; . . . granting to any corporation,
association, or individual . . . any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise
whatever . . . . In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable no special
law shall be enacted.
73. Skinner, 38 III. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).
74. Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
75. Skinner, 38 Ill. 2d at -,
231 N.E.2d at 590-91; Phillips, 611 P.2d at 826 (quoting
Skinner, 38 III. 2d at -,
231 N.E.2d at 590-91).
76. Skinner, 38 11. 2d at -,
231 N.E.2d at 590-91; Phillips, 611 P.2d at 826 (quoting
Skinner, 38 III. 2d at - 231 N.E.2d at 590-91).
77. Skinner, 38 Ill. 2d at -, 231 N.E.2d at 591; Phillips, 611 P.2d at 826 (quoting Skinner, 38 Ill. 2d at -,
231 N.E.2d at 591).
78. Skinner, 38 Il1.2d at _ 231 N.E.2d at 591; Phillips, 611 P.2d at 831.
79. Special Project, supra note 6, at 468.
80. McGovern, supra note 7, at 620.
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tional presumption under the rational-basis test would be rebutted and
more product liability repose statutes might fall.
B.

Due Process

Traditional Supreme Court due-process analysis requires that legislation not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and have a real
and substantial relation to the legislative objective 8 1-a test that resembles the rational-basis equal-protection standard. Under modern analysis, courts have applied differing degrees of judicial scrutiny depending
upon the nature of the legislation at issue and the rights affected. 82 In
the area of economic legislation, which includes repose statutes, the Supreme Court has adopted a "hands-off" approach which in effect
presumes the existence of facts supporting legislative judgments.83
However, some state courts have not consistently adhered to this standard in evaluating the constitutionality of product liability repose
84

statutes.
Due-process grounds of attack on product liability statutes of repose are somewhat more common than those based upon equal-protection concepts.85 The majority of the repose statutes that have been declared unconstitutional were overturned primarily on a due-process
argument based upon a state constitutional provision guaranteeing access to the courts. 86 However, other states have adopted a divergent
approach to this same type of provision and upheld the constitutionality
of their repose statutes. 7
One of the three courts which have overturned state product liability repose statutes based on state access to courts provisions 8 has followed the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in Overland Con81. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
82. Increased judicial scrutiny has been applied to legislation impacting on noneconomic
rights in the areas of privacy, autonomy, and family relations. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

570-646 (10th ed. 1980).

83. Id. at 540.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 87-105.
85. McGovern, supra note 7, at 613.
86. Dworkin, supra note 3, at 61. For example, the North Carolina "access to courts" or
"open-courts" clause states: "All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice
shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
87. Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Thornton v. Mono Mfg.
Ind. -, 418
App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Co., 99 Ill.
N.E.2d 207 (1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 107-22.
88. See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty Corp., 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Battilla
v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54
N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified and affid, 306 N.D. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415
(1982).
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struction Co. v. Sirmons," in which a twelve-year architect-contractor
repose statute was at issue. In Overland, the Florida Supreme Court
categorized the plaintiff's right of access to the courts as a common-law
right which the legislature was powerless to abolish, unless it could
show an "overpowering public necessity for the abolishment" and provide a reasonable alternative designed to protect the right to redress for
injuries. 90 Since the plaintiff was clearly without an alternative remedy
and the legislature had not expressed such a necessity, the repose statute was held unconstitutional.9 While the court recognized the difficulties of proof and rising industry standards that would inevitably arise
and expose builders to potential liability for an indefinite period of time
after completion of construction, it reasoned that the impact of these
problems would be felt by all litigants. 92 The court found that these
problems were neither unique nor "sufficiently compelling" to justify
the total abolition of an injured party's cause of action. 98 It concluded
that the repose statute impermissibly benefits only one class of defendants at the expense of an injured party's right to sue."
One year later the Florida Supreme Court, in Battilla v. Allis
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,9 issued a short, conclusory opinion
voiding the twelve-year product liability statute of repose on the authority of Overland.9" It subsequently affirmed its finding of unconstitutionality in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,'9 7 a case which involved a
daughter's DES-induced injury that was discovered twenty years after
her mother's ingestion of the drug.
In Bolick v. American Barmag Corporation," the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also invalidated the state's six-year product
liability repose statute as violative of the North Carolina constitutionally guaranteed right of access to the courts. 99 The court noted that
until a product causes actual injury, no claim can accrue.100 Because
the statute extinguished the right to sue before a cause of action existed, it was deemed unconstitutional on its face. 0 1

89. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
90. Id. at 573 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)).
91. Id. at 574.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1979).
96. Id.
97. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
98. 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified and afid, 306 N.C. 364, 293
S.E.2d 415 (1982).
99. Id. at 595, 284 S.E.2d at 192.
100. Id. at 591, 284 S.E.2d at 190.
101. Id. at 590, 284 S.E.2d at 189.
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The Alabama Supreme Court, in Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &
Hagerty,"°2 offered the clearest interpretation of a state constitutional
"open-court" clause that has yet been used to upset the constitutionality of a product liability statute of repose. The open-court clause was
considered a guaranty of common-law rights; the legislative abolition of
such rights, including the common-law cause of action, was held to be
constitutional only if voluntarily given up in return for an equivalent
benefit, or abolished in order to eradicate a social evil.' 0 3 In the absence
of any voluntary relinquishment of the right, the court reviewed at
length the evidence bearing on the issue of whether a substantial relationship existed between the statute and the perceived social
evil-namely, the product liability "crisis. '' °0 The court questioned the
existence of an insurance crisis and was unpersuaded that the legislative objective of reducing the cost of product liability insurance would
be substantially affected by the operation of the statute in cutting off
claims after the repose period. 05 The ten-year statute was, therefore,
held unconstitutional. 0 6
On the other side of this proconsumer approach to the state constitutional right of access to courts analysis is another line of cases: most
of which acknowledge the right of access to courts, but all of which
deny that a legislative enactment extinguishing potential causes of action necessarily violates due process. 0 7 The courts adopting this position have focused upon the fact that the causes of action abolished by
the applicable repose statute were not vested-that is, had not accrued-upon the effective date of the statute.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,10 8
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the ten-year product liability repose statute violated the open-court guaranty of the Indiana Constitution. 1°9 The court held that the plaintiff had no existing cause of action
for wrongful death from which she could claim the vested right to a
remedy under the open-court clause. 1 0 Her cause of action had not
accrued at the time the statute went into effect."' By the time the
plaintiff's husband died and a cause of action for wrongful death would

102. 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
103. Id. at 1000.
104. Id. at 1001.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1004.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 107-22. See also Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping
Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Rosenberg, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
108. Ind. __, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981).
109. Id. at -,
418 N.E.2d at 213.
110. Id.
Ill. by
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have accrued, the ten-year ceiling on product liability actions under the
repose statute automatically barred it. The court bowed to the presumptive validity of the legislation and thus upheld the repose statute
12
against state constitutional attack."
In Buckner v. GAF Corp.,"' the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee upheld a ten-year product liability
date-of-sale repose statute against the plaintiffs' claim for damages for
asbestos-related injuries. 14 The plaintiffs' action was filed beyond the
ten-year repose period, but one year prior to the enactment of an
amendment excluding asbestos-related personal injury claims from the
repose statute's bar. 1 " The plaintiffs argued that application of the
original, unamended statute to bar their claim would be unconstitutional because it would deny them an opportunity to pursue a remedy
for their injuries. 1 The plaintiffs contended that a reasonable period
of time should be allowed them to pursue their cause of action. 117
The Buckner court, following its own position in an earlier case," 8
held that date-of-wrongful act or date-of-sale repose statutes for defective products lacked the arbitrariness which violates the minimum-level
standard of review of due process. 9 Therefore, the due-process chal12 0
lenge was rejected.
The third state to sustain the constitutionality of its product liability statute of repose in the face of a due-process attack was Illinois in
Thornton v. Mono Manufacturing Co. 21 The Appellate Court of Illinois there held a ten-year repose statute constitutional on due-process
grounds since it bore a reasonable relationship to its intended purpose
of "dampen[ing]" the swift rise in product liability insurance rates. 2
The court reasoned that the statute does not bar a cause of action
before it accrues, but merely prevents a cause of action from ever
arising.12
The different approaches taken in these cases reflect the inherent
judicial conflict between respect for legislative judgment in areas of economic regulation and equal protection of all members of soci-

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
495 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hargraves, 317 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
Buckner, 495 F. Supp. at 353.
Id.
99 III. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
Id. at 726, 425 N.E.2d at 524-25.
Id. at 726, 425 N.E.2d at 525.
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ety-manufacturers and consumers alike-from discriminatory laws.
The primary difference between the two positions adopted by these
courts is that in some jurisdictions there is no legislative power to abolish common-law rights; in others, the legislature has the capacity to
extinguish any right which has not yet vested.
An unusual case recently decided in Indiana presented a relatively
new line of due-process attack on the validity of repose statutes. In
Pitts v. Unarco Industries, Inc.,' 24 the plaintiff, suing for the wrongful
death of her husband by asbestosis, claimed that the state repose statute was unconstitutional because it deprived her of property without
due process of law.1 25 In support of this allegation, she cited a recent
Supreme Court decision which held that an accrued cause of action is a
property right protected by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 26 The court ruled that the plaintiff had no property right because the cause of action was unaccrued at the time the
repose statute was enacted. 1 7 The cause of action did not accrue until
her husband's death, some two years after the repose statute had been
the court held that the statute was not violapassed.' 2 8 Consequently,
129
tive of due process.
Despite the outcome in Pitts, the line of attack used in that case
offers the best hope of recovery to future plaintiffs with delayed-manifestation injury claims which would otherwise be barred by statutes of
repose. The plaintiff in Pitts was unsuccessful in overturning the Indiana repose statute due to the fact that her cause of action was for
wrongful death and could not accrue until death occurred. However,
death is not a prerequisite to a valid delayed-manifestation injury
claim. Under the Pitts rationale, what is critical to the latter claim is
that the injury giving rise to the product liability cause of action accrued before the enactment of the repose statute. This is possible because most product liability repose statutes are less than a decade old,
and some delayed-manifestation injuries only become observable several decades after use of, or exposure to, a defective product. If the
cause of action for the injury accrued during the exposure period and
before enactment of the statute, then the argument could be made that
a repose statute which abolishes an accrued cause of action unconstitutionally deprives plaintiffs of a vested property right. The statute would

124.
125.
126.
(1982).
127.

712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 279.
The Supreme Court case referred to is Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
Pins, 712 F.2d at 279.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.
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therefore violate due process of law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional challenges are the most comprehensive way to eliminate statutes of repose. Since the Heath court broke new ground in
applying heightened scrutiny to invalidate a repose statute, courts can
expect more equal-protection challenges to arise in the future. With the
staggering increase in cases involving delayed-manifestation injuries,
judges should become more concerned about excluding this large group
of plaintiffs from the courts. This concern could translate into increased
acceptance of new standards of constitutional analysis as applied to repose statutes. Greater judicial amenability to the use of heightened
scrutiny in equal-protection cases and the more efficient use by plaintiffs of the due-process-protected property right argument may lead to
the more rapid elimination of these harsh and discriminatory rules.
Laurie Takeno Shield
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